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acquittal.

The state charged
appropriating

theft by unauthorized

Johnson
(R., pp. 30-31.)

matter proceeded to trial,

following evidence was presented:
Steve Beaudry modifies Kawasaki motorcycles
24 -

16, L. 5.)

police use. (Tr., p. 9, L.
a competitor, canceled

Beaudry's contract to be a Kawasaki dealer, necessitating that Beaudry acquire
the motorcycles he wished
- p. 18, L. 12.)

modify through a Kawasaki dealer. (Tr., p. 16, L. 6

Beaudry thereafter arranged to purchase motorcycles through

Darrick Johnson, doing business as Edge Performance, an authorized Kawasaki
dealer. (Tr., p. 18, L. 13 - p. 19, L. 25.) Beaudry gave Johnson a check for the
purchase of four motorcycles from Kawasaki. (Tr., p. 20, L. 1 - p. 21, L. 2.)
Johnson was to keep five percent of the money and the rest he was to use to
order the motorcycles from Kawasaki. (Tr., p. 21, L. 3 - p. 22, L. 7; p. 22, Ls. 1321.)
Johnson deposited the money. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 12-14.) He told Beaudry
the bikes had been ordered from Kawasaki.

(Tr., p. 30, L. 13 - p. 31, L. 7.)

Johnson later claimed delays in getting the bikes were due to Kawasaki's
reluctance to provide the motorcycles for Beaudry. (Tr., p. 32, L. 20 - p. 33, L,

1

After significant delay, Beaudry asked for his money back and Johnson
that Kawasaki

, p. 34, Ls. 6-19.)

it.

Shortly

Johnson instructed Beaudry to not contact him again, but that he would contact
Beaudry "the second I have the check." (Tr., p. 34, L. 20 - p. 35, L. 8.) Beaudry
approached Johnson in the showroom and asked for either the motorcycles or
the return of his money, but Johnson said he was keeping the money "and not
giving it back."

(Tr., p. 35, L. 18 - p. 36,

12.) Johnson never ordered the

motorcycles for Beaudry but instead used the money to purchase motorcycles
that he sold through his business. (Tr., p. 49,

12 - p. 55, L. 2; State's Exhibits

1, 2.)
At the conclusion of the state's case Johnson moved for an acquittal,
asserting the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. (Tr., p. 65, L.
24 - p. 76, L. 24.) After a break to review the relevant case law, the district court
indicated its analysis and stated it was "going to grant the motion to acquit." (Tr.,
p. 76, L. 25

p. 79, L. 3.) The prosecutor responded with further argument about

why the evidence was sufficient and requested reconsideration. (Tr., p. 79, L. 22
p. 83, L. 2.) The court agreed to reconsider. (Tr., p. 83, L. 3; p. 87, Ls. 2-13.)
The next day the court took the motion to acquit back up, noting it had
given the matter "more review and more thought." (Tr., p. 93, Ls. 4-13.) It stated
that the "facts that have been adduced thus far in the case" were as follows:
Beaudry paid $55,256 to the defendant on October 8, 2011, for the
purchase of four motorcycles. Mr. Johnson promised delivery
within one week to ten days. The text messages which are in
evidence show that they began on October 10, 2011. There were
first discussions about issues with respect to the check being
cashed. On the next day, October 11, it was confirmed that the
2

concerned, was on October 1
would not ship the bikes because they were going to be going
ultimately to Mr. Beaudry. On October 25 Mr. Beaudry asked for
his money back. Mr. Johnson stated in effect he would not-he
would get it back when they, meaning Kawasaki, sent it to Mr.
Johnson. And later that day Mr. Johnson tells Mr. Beaudry
contact him anymore.
Also earlier on October 6 Spokane County sent out a notice
of request for bids for a motorcycle, the same make and model as
Beaudry subsequently contracted to buy from Edge performance,
Johnson's company. And Edge Performance sent a bid
City of Spokane-the City of Spokane, not Spokane County, on
October 20, 2011. The city accepted the bid on November 22, and
purchase order went out on
(Tr., p. 93, L. 14 - p. 94, L. 18.) The district court applied

law to those facts

and concluded that the jury could conclude Johnson had taken unauthorized
control of the money by spending it on things other than the motorcycles he had
agreed to buy on Beaudry's behalf.

(Tr., p. 94, L. 19 - p. 97, L. 7.) The trial

court then denied the motion to acquit. (Tr., p. 97, Ls. 8-22.)
The trial proceeded, and at the end the jury returned a guilty verdict. (Tr.,
p. 256, L. 11 - p. 257, L. 1; R., p. 92.) Johnson filed a motion for judgment of
acquittal. (R., pp. 94-95.) The district court granted the motion. (R., p. 116; see
also Tr., p. 265, L. 22 - p. 271, L. 9.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal.
(R., pp. 118-21.)

3

ISSUES
evidence showed that the victim gave
money to buy
motorcycles from a third party, creating a bailment. Instead Johnson
appropriated the money to himself. Did the district court err by applying
an incorrect legal standard to determine that Johnson had a legal right to
appropriate the money entrusted to him for a different purpose?
Does this Court have authority to grant the state relief because double
jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the jury's guilty verdict?

4

principle it was
arm's

possession

party and the receiving
stand."
Beaudry

a

as

to

(Tr., p 269 Ls. 21
his

was therefore
Although he had a civil
an interest in the

.)

,a

case

The court then reasoned

in the money" once

owner of the money."

it to Johnson,

(Tr., p. 270,

1.)

for breach of contract, "because [Beaudry] did
there was no theft.

, p. 270, Ls. 11-17.)

This analysis is incorrect on both the facts and the law. it is not true that
in every contract the delivery of physical possession of money or an item
relinquishes all rights in that money or item. In this case the parties intended that
Kawasaki, not Johnson, ultimately get the money Beaudry paid. Johnson was a
mere bailor of the money acting as Beaudry's agent to purchase the motorcycles,
and was not entitled to use or possession of the money beyond fulfilling his
bailment or agency. When he misappropriated the money by diverting it to his
own use he exercised unauthorized control of money that was not his.
district court therefore erred and must be reversed.

5

The

B.

district

test
judgment of acquittal is to determine

ru

on a

the evidence was

to

sustain a conviction of the crime charged." State v. Chacon, 145 Idaho 814, 818,
186 P.3d 670, 674 (Ct App. 2008). Where the defendant presents evidence, all
evidence presented at trial is considered.

kL

If a reasonable juror could have

found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict must be sustained, and the
reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of
sustaining the verdict, including cred

of witnesses.

kL;

State v. Doe, 144

Idaho 796, 798, 172 P 3d 551, 553 (Ct App. 2007).

C.

Johnson Committed Grand Theft By Unauthorized Control When He
Misappropriated Money Entrusted To Him For A Specific Purpose
The state charged Johnson with theft by unauthorized control. (R, pp. 30-

31.) "A person commits theft when he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized
control over ... the property of another person, with the intent of depriving the
owner thereof." I.C. § 18-2403(3). There is no dispute that Johnson knowingly
exercised unauthorized control over about $50,000 with intent of depriving
Beaudry of that money. The only question is whether the money was Beaudry's
or Johnson's. The evidence establishes that Beaudry still had legal claim to the
money greater than Johnson's legal claim because Beaudry gave Johnson that
money to pay a third party for motorcycles, and thereby created a bailment by
which Johnson merely held the money in trust
A bailment is:

6

1
1,545

a

12).

in this case shows that,

to be kept as a

Johnson was delivered

trust

money Beaudry delivered to
the

purchase of motorcycles from Kawasaki.
"d

in

with

a special object"
Johnson determined not to
purpose of the trust" he exercise

unauthorized control. Because he held the money only in trust, Johnson did not
have superior right to the money than Beaud

and thus was guilty of theft.

The district court concluded that where, "in a contractual arm's length
transaction, a party gives possession of property to the other party and the
receiving party thereafter fails to perform, a criminal case for theft will not stand."
(Tr., p. 269, Ls. 18-25.) This is a misstatement of law as applied to theft by
unauthorized control, where the defendant will often legally acquire possession of
the property through contract, yet still be guilty of theft by unauthorized control
once he appropriates that property to his own use instead of the intended use of
that property.
Although mere breach of contract should generally not be enforced
through the criminal law, the "reasons that underlie the rejection of criminal
sanctions do not apply to the circumstances

7

every case involving a contract."

State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43,

501 P.2d 727, 734 (1972).
of ..

Thus, where "a

of another upon any

express or implied" but then "fraudulently converts [it] to his own use" he "may be
gu

of the crime of embezzlement."

lsL

51, 501 P.2d at 735 (internal

quotations omitted). See also State v. Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 941, 935 P .2d
201: 204 (Ct. App. 1997) (embezzlement includes misappropriating funds after
defendant lawfully received them).

Here Johnson received the money only in

trust, and therefore committed theft by unauthorized control when he fraudulently
converted it to his own, rather than its intended, use.
The cases relied on by the district

do not reject the principles

announced in Jesser, or call them into question. In State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho
278, 246 P.3d 387 (2010), Bennett purchased a trailer, agreeing to make
payments on the purchase price. Even though the contract included a term that
the trailer was not to be moved, and the trailer was chained in its location,
Bennett moved the trailer and refused to make payments.

The state charged

Bennett with grand theft under I.C. § 18-2403(1). The Court concluded that "a
seller of goods who has delivered the goods to the buyer, but has not yet been
paid in full and does not have a security interest, is not an owner of the goods for
the purposes of I.C. § 18-2403(1 )."

lsL

at 278, 246 P.3d at 387. Because the

seller delivered the trailer "without qualification and without retaining a legally
cognizant security interest" Bennett had a possessory right superior to the
seller's, and therefore did not steal the trailer from its owner.
at 389.

8

lsL at 280,246 P.3d

In

case
use

=~= had

It

it to a

as
instead
been req

the

his own

a

to

party, and

ad

would have

in that case,
130 Idaho

Henninger

945 P,2d 864 (Ct. App, 1997),

a pickup upon his promissory note to pay a $5000 down
"

(

had

that

an

that amount and the money would

wired to him,)

Henninger did not make the payment, or any other, and was

with theft

insurance settlement

by unauthorized control. The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the contract
granted Henninger ownership of the pickup and that his control was therefore not
"unauthorized,"

1iL at 641,945

P,2d at 867. 1

Thus, in both Bennett and Henninger the defendants failed to make
promised payments under a contract. Failure to make payments did not alone
deprive them of the already conferred rights to the sold property such that they
were stealing the property by retaining possession,

Unlike Bennett and

Henninger, however, Johnson was not the intended final recipient of the property
in question,

Rather, Johnson accepted money for a limited purpose of

The Court noted that Henninger likely committed theft by deception by
misrepresenting that he had $5000 immediately available to him. 1iL at 643, 945
P.2d at 869.

1

9

motorcycles from a third party on Beaudry's behalf. What
of a

taking money from

. although

did was
was

lawful, by appropriating the money instead of delivering it as required by
contract, he committed theft.
in State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322,193 P.3d 869 (2008), Culbreth
broke into the dog pound and took her impounded dog back, and was convicted
of burglary.

The Court of Appeals reversed.

Specifically, because Culbreth's

intent was to recover her dog she did not intend to commit a theft, because the
pound did not have "a lien upon or other property interest in the dog superior to
Culbreth's ownership interest."

kL. at 324,

193 P.3d at 871. Just as Culbreth did

not lose her property interest in her dog merely because the pound lawfully took
custody of it,

Beaudry did not lose his right to not have his money

misappropriated instead of used for its intended purpose merely because he
provided it to Johnson pursuant to a contract.
The flaw in the district court's reasoning that all breaches of contract are
necessarily not thefts is apparent. It can hardly be disputed that a lawyer who
accepts $55,000 from his client, where $50,000 is meant to pay the settlement
the lawyer has negotiated and $5,000 is to pay the lawyer's fee, the lawyer would
commit grand theft by taking the entire sum for himself. Likewise, if Ebenezer
Scrooge gave a boy outside his window money to buy a Christmas turkey and an
extra half-crown for his efforts, the boy would commit theft if he kept all the
money and did not buy the turkey.

In both these hypothetical situations the

10

a

h it was

it was

for

unauthorized control for
in

for

from a

the money
motorcycles

Johnson

purpose

district court's conclusion, that "once the

party.

the money to the defendant, the victim parted with his interest in
money" and therefore Johnson's ownership interest was superior (Tr., p. 270, Ls.
8-11), is unsupported by the law
court erred and

is an umeasonable reading of the evidence.
reversed.

II.
This Court May Reverse The District Court's Judgment Of Acquittal Within The
Proper Bounds Of Johnson's Protections Against Double Jeopardy
In this appeal the state challenges the district court's post-verdict
judgment of acquittal.

(R., pp. 92, 116.)

Double jeopardy bars post-acquittal

proceedings on guilt, but does not bar the reinstatement of a previous verdict
after reversal of a judgment of acquittal. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,
467 (2005); State v. Carmouche, _
6153145 (Ct. App. 2013).

Idaho _ , _

P.3d _ , 2013 WL

Because the state seeks reversal of the post-verdict

judgment of acquittal and reinstatement of the jury verdict, this appeal and the
state's requested remedy are not barred by double jeopardy.

11

reverse

this 20th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of December, 2013, I caused
true and correct copies
the foregoing
OF RESPON
to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
MALCOLM S. DYMKOSKI
Attorney at Law
1110 W Park Place, Suite 210
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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